in th e mul tiple reversals' an d divid e d c o urts~ that h ave become the h a llm a rk of fa ir use litiga ti o n .
This unhappy state of affairs h as le d some legal sch o la rs to conclude th at th e doctrine of fair u se is imp ervious to g enerali zati o n s, a nd thus th a t its m e anin g sh o uld be de rived "bv inducti o n from concrete cases. "9 Other promin e n t sch o lars h a\'e rej ec ted this ske ptical conclusio n , and have instead sought to explain and , wh ere possible, to justify a particular inte rpretation of the fa ir use doctrine. The th eories pro fe rre d in supp o rt of th ese interpre tations fa ll in to two ge n e ral ca teg ories: those that explain fair use in, bro adly speaking, efficiency terms I o and tho se that see fa ir use as an el ab o ra tion of certain co mmunitari an id e als.! I Given that the do ctrine at issu e is "fair use ," co n spicuous by its abse nc e is an explanation of the d octrin e grounded in m o re ge n eral conside ration s of fa irness . I~ The vari ous attempts to explain the do ctrine by economic e ffici e ncy and co mmunita ria n principl es ar e misguided . The most we ll-kn own and fully d evelope d accounts are internally inconsiste nt, n early impossibl e to implem e nt in practice , a nd incapable of offering guidance to pote ntial users of '(/, 72 3 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983) , rn)d 47 1 U. S. 539 (1985) the decision of th e di stri ct court to award damages to th e pl ain tiff was reve rsed by th e Secon d Circu it, which in turn was reversed by th e Supreme Court. In Salinger v. Random House , Inc. ; 650 F. Su p p. 41 3 (S.D.N.Y 1986) , wu'rl, 8 11 F.2cl90 (2d. Cir.) , rerl. denil'(/484 U. S. 890 (1 987) , the Second Circuit reversed th e distri ct court's finding of fair use . In New Era Publicati o ns Inte rn a tional v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y 1988 ), a[j'rl o n oth er grounds, 873 F. 2d 5 76 (2cl. Cir. 1989 ) th e distri c t court's finding of fair use was reversed on appeal. Fin ally, in Camp bell\'. Ac u ff-Rose Music , In c., 754 F. Supp. 11 50 (M. D. Tenn. 199 1), wu'd 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992 ) , rn01 5 10 U.S. 569 1164 (1994) , the district cou rt's findin g of fair use was reversed by the Sixth Circuit an cl then reve rsed again by th e Supre m e Co urt.
8. In th e first two cases that reac h ed the Supre me Court it spli t 4-4 and th us in both cases n o opinion was issu ed . Se11 Willia ms & Wilkins Co. v. U nited States, 420 U . S. 376 (1975) ; Columbia Broad castin g Sys. v. Lowe's, In c., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) . The Sony case was decided by a 5-4 maj ori ty ; sel' Sony, 464 U. S. 417; the HrnjJer & Row case was d ecided by a 6--3 m ajority; see HarjJer & Row, 471 U.S. 539. 9. We inre b, sujJia note 1, at 11 38.
10. See, e. g 11. See, r. g ., Linda J. Lacey, Of Brrad and Roses and CojJyriglzls, 1989 DuKE L. .f. 1532 , 1584 -93 (1989 . 12. \,\'e inrc b in hi s sh ort comment on Leva!, sujJra note 2 , does n ot advance a full-fl edge d th eorv of fairn ess or an ythin g a kin to that. Alth o ugh h e d ee m s fairn ess pertin e nt to th e Hfa ir use" problem h e to uts a case-by-case an alvsis and docs n o t o ffer a sp eci fi c test that can be appli ed to fair use d e terminati o ns .. 'ite\•\'einre b, sujJm n ote l. It is n o tcworth\·that th e app roac h \Ve in reb intimates a nd th e \·icw I lav o ut in thi s art icle \arv d ra m atica ll v. copyrighted works. In addition, these accounts fail to account for central features of existing doctrine and rest on dubious normative foundations.
Property rights are normally understood as conferring upon their holders th e power to exclude and to alienate. Thus, property rights are often understood in terms of control or autonomy over a resource that resid es in th e right holder. The t~1ir use do ctrin e h as established a significant conso-aint on the power of a right holder to control one 's resources. Such constraints typically call for a justification. In other words, the prin ciple , if there is one, that underli es fair use doctrine should explain why some uses or takings are "fair" and thus do not require compensation, '"'hereas other uses are unjustified takings requiring compensation. Existing theorizing fails to produce the ne ed ed justificatory principle.
After making good on m y claim that prevailing accounts inadequately explain existing fair use doctrine and fail to justify the distinctions fair use doctrine invariably involves, I propose an alternative account that explains central features of existing doctrine, offers practical guidance, is implementable in practice, and is , in addition, normatively attractive.
My claim is that "fair use" doctrin e embodies a general requirement of fairness that is expressed by what George Fletcher refers to as the paradigm of reciprocity of risk .l'l At the heart of this paradigm lies the principle that liability should be affixed to persons who impose nonreciprocal risks on others. This principle is satisfied when a person creates a risk to others that is different in degree or kind from the risks to which this person is subject.l4 Reciprocal risks, on the other hand, do not give rise to liability because they cancel or balance each other. To determine which risks are reciprocal and which are not, one ought to look to the customary practices and the social conventions that govern risks in a relevant community.
Understanding fair use as an elaboration of the principle of reciprocal risk has two implications for how courts should understand and apply the doctrine in particular cases. First, only creators but not copycats should b e potential candidates for fair use. This is because copycats who slavishly reproduce intellectual works impose a nonreciprocal risk on creators of copyrighted works. Second, only users whose takings comport with customary practices that govern creative activities in the relevant community should be able to avail themselves of the fair use defense.
Although these principles fall short of supporting a bright line rule, they are clear and relatively easy to apply. ' While I do not claim that courts have consistently decided fair use cases in accordance with these principles, I do claim that a significant part of the case law is compatible with the m. More importantly, these two principles are reconcilable with the constitutional 13 . See George F. Fletcher, Frurness 1/1/(/ Utility i 11 "l in I Themy, 80 H . .>.R\". L Rr:v. 537 ( 1972) [hereinafter: Fletcher].
14. lrl. at 5cJ8.
and statutory provtstons that demarcate the law of copyright, and thus courts may apply these principles without need for any legislative action. The article itself is divided into four parts. Part I sketches the developmen_t of the fair use doctrine ever since its emergence in the English courts of Law and Equity to the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Part II describes and evaluates the prevailing efficiency and communitarian theories of fair use. Part III, the heart of the article, explores the relation among fair use, corrective justice, and reciprocity of risk. It also provides a rights-based analysis of the doctrine of fair use and lays out a normative theory of how fair use cases should be decided. Part IV shows how the paradigm of reciprocity of risk fits within the statutory framework and applies it to some of the leading fair use cases.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: BETWEEN FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY
The doctrine of fair use originated in the decisions of the English Law and Equity courts. A review of the early English cases reveals that, in its nascent form, fair use was a relatively coherent doctrine.lS The English courts regarded the copyright as the property of the author and treated intangible and real property evenhandedly.l6 The focal point of the fair use inquiry was whether the putatively infringing use of the defendant was legitimate. In particular, the courts looked to two factors: whether the putatively infringing use involved "the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the character of an original work"l7 and whether the second user had taken from the first with the intention of pirating (animo furandi) _18 It is important to note, however, that when the allegedly infringing work failed to meet the required standard of creativity, fair use was denied, notwithstanding the fact that the second user had acted in good faith.l9 In addition to these two factors-the nature of the second use and the intention of the appropriator-the English courts ascribed some importance to prevailing customs and practices of trade.20 A fact that bears emphasis is the strict exclusion of public utility considerations from the fair use inquiry. 18. See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170-71 (1803) . 19. See, e.g., Roworth v. Wilkes 1 Camp. 94 (K.B. 1807) ; alm Patry, supra note 3, at 11 n. 22 and the sources cited therein. As Patrv points out, the absence of aminus jinandi did not operate as a legal defense, but its presence operated "to deprive the appropriator of the privilege of fair use. " !d. 20. Doclsley v. Kinnersley Am b. 403,405 (1761) (No. 212) . ("The court must take notice of the springs !lowing from trade; ancl though they cannot regard customs of trade as binding, yet will consider the consequences of them").
ce ntered on th e rights of th e co pyri g ht own er vis-:t-vis the all eged in fr inger. The inte rest of the public at large was deem ed irr e l eva nt.~l Th e early Ame rican decisions foll owed th e prin cipl es th at had bee n laid o ut by the En g lish courts . Th e essen ce of th e fa ir u se doctrin e that evolved in En glan d was cap tured by Justice Story in hi s landm ark opinion in Folsom v. Nlanh.'2~ Jus tice Sto r y began his opinion by describing two extreme cases of copying. At th e on e extreme he loccned cases wh e re the e ntire substan ce of a copyrighted work is lifted . At th e o pposite ex tre m e h e located cases of copyin g for th e purposes of ge nuin e revi ew and criticism that do n o t supersed e th e o rigin al work. ' 2:i In-be tween cases we re requi re d to ex hibit a "real, substanti al conde nsatio n of th e materials, and intellec tual lab o r and judgme nt bestowed th e reon; a nd not merely fa cile use of th e scissors."24
As William Patry points ou t, Story's o pinio n in Folsom is laudable because it avoids the mistake of weighing th e inte res t of the autho r against th e interest of th e public. Instead , it fo cuses on th e question wheth e r th e defendant's ta king was fair.~5 It is notewo rthy th at in this case the infringing work was an ado ption of a se ries of books on th e life and writings of President Washington that was intended to ser ve sch ool libraries, and thus the public interest strongly supported a finding of fair use .' 26 Nonetheless, this fac tor did not figure in Story's d ecision. However, public interes t and utilitarian considerations did not remain b eyond th e ken of the fair u se d e termination forever.
Utilitarian stan with prec isely th e "publi c inte rest" inquiry, whi c h may be expressed in the question, "Does the publi c interest favor enforcing pl ain tiffs cop yrig ht~" justi ce Stor y did n ot make th e e rror of balancin g the inte rests of th e author and th e public, but instead examined whe th er "defenda nts usc qualified as fa ir use with the fu ll burden of making ou t an affirmative defen se properl y res tin g on the d efe nda nt"' [e mphasis in the origin al]) .
26. More sp ecifically, the clefend an ts copied ::1 19 letters of Presid e nt Washington that were includ ed in the original work. Th ey die! not copy any of th e narrative pans. The d efe ndant 's book co nta ined 866 pages a nd was writte n in the form oLm autobiography. The orig ina l wo rk co nsi sted of twe lve \·o J um es.
27. 306 F. 'To Promote the Progress of Sc ie n ce and the Usefu l Arts." .. . To serve that p urpose, "co urts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occas ionally subordinate the copyright holde r' s inte rest in maximum fin a ncia l re turn to the greate r public interest in th e cle,·elopment of art, scien ce and inclustry. "' 2S
Since Rosemont, utilitarian co nsid erations have been gaining ground at the expe n se of fairness. Ye t, n otio n s of fairn ess ha\·e continu ed to figure in fair use cases alo ngside utilitarian n otions. ?9 Th e fair use d oc trine has b ecome a h otc hp otc h of fairness and utility. Instead of clarify ing the con tours of the fair use d oc trine, the shift from fairness to effic ie ncv has resulted in a I qu a ndary.
Congress contributed to th e fair use conundrum when it codified th e fair use doctrine in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The statutory provision is b est described by Weinreb:
Having indicated tha t it did not intend to alter th e pri o r law or inhibit its furth e r judicial developme nt, Congress adopted three con siderably inconsistent ways of doing nothing : simple reference to fair use, specification of wha t is fa ir use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive "factors to be considered" in determining whether a particul ar use is fair.30
The problem with the statutory provision is that it says too much and too little at the same time. 31 It neither defines "fair use" nor formulates a test of fairn ess. Instead, the section provides a non-exh austive list of illustrative u ses-such as comment, criticism, scholarship, research, news reporting, and teaching-that may qualify as non-infringing u ses, and then it enumer-28. !d. at 307. It is importan t to n ote that the court negl ec ted to m e ntion that the Constitu- Notwithstanding the provisio n s of section 106, th e fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by r eproductio n in copies or phon o r ecords or by any other m ean s specifi ed by that section , for purposes such as criticism , com m ent, news reporting, teaching (including multipl e cop ies for classroom use), sc h o larship , or research, is n ot an in fr in gement of copyrigh t. In determining wheth er the use m a de of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considere d sh all include-
( 1) the purpose and charac te r of the use, including wh e th er such use is of a commercia l nature or is for nonprofi t ed ucational purposes; (2) the na ture of the copyrig hted work; (3) the amo unt and substantial ity of th e portion used in relation to the copyr ig hte d work as a whole; and (4) th e effec t of the use up on the potential market for or ,·,due of the copyTightecl work.
ares four factors to be weighed by the courts in deciding wheth e r a particular use is fa ir. The factors sp ecified in the section are: ( l) the purpose of th e use, including its commercial or n o n-com m e rcial nature; (2) th e nature of th e protected work of th e pl aintiff; (3) the amount ;:mel importa n ce of th e parts that were reproduced; and ( 4) th e impact of the use on "th e potential marke t or th e value of th e copyrighted work. "
The statutory text gives ri se to various problems. It remains uncl ear how th e illustrative uses and the list of factors are to be reconcil ed; wheth e r all four factors ought to be satisfied for a fair use to b e grante d; how much weight each of the four fac tors is to be accorded in cases of cont1ict; wh e ther additional factors can be considered and what they are . Even more vexing is th e fact that th e statutory formulation fails to specify an underlying principle th at should guide th e courts in h ard cases. In sum, without an underlying principle, the statutory language offers very little purchase on th e question of fair use. Even so , when the legislation emerged ther e existed a forlorn hope that th e courts, most notably the Suprem e Court, would fill in the statutory void and provide the missing prin ciple . This hope did not materialize.
Virtually all commentators agre e tha t the Supreme Court fail ed to apply consistently the statutory provision and th at its assay to make sense of it only added to its preexisting a mbiguity.:~~ Unable to d ecide which of the four fa ctors should control when th ey conflict, the Court vacillated among the various factors, and after a d ecade of confusing statements:l:l concluded that "the more transformative th e n ew work, the less will be the significance of other factors ... that may weigh against a finding of fair use. "?.4 Furtherm o re , the Court did not confine itself to the statutory criteria. In particular, th e Court clearly indicated that fairn ess and custom are still p ertinent to th e fair use analysis d espite the fact that section 107 makes no mention of them .35 At the end of the day, the Supreme Court's interpretation of th e statutory provision is of very little value. Aside from exploring the four statutory factors and adding some extraneous ones, the Suprem e Court d ecisions provide very limited insights into the foundations of th e doctrine. The current state of affairs exacts a hca\V toll on authors and users of intellectual works as well as on the public at large. In its present form the fair use doctrine significantlv adulterates the right of authors over their work. Furthermore, it impairs the abilitv of authors and users to ascertain their respective rights and privileges vis-a-vis one another. This in turn may lead to underproduction or diminished use of intellectual works. The incoherence of the doctrine mav also g-enerate excessive litig:ation}li
Against this backdrop, several attempts have been made to rid the doctrine of its incoherence and provide a principled test for cleterrnining fair use. It is to these attempts that I now turn.
II. ECON O M IC EF FICIE NCY AN D COMMUN ITARI ANISM
The existing literature offers two theories that seek to explain and justify the fair use doctrine: economic efficiency and communitarianism. Economic efficiency is both a positive and a normative theory. As a positive theory, economic efficiency is aimed at demonstrating that law can be best understood in wealth-maximizing terms. As a normative theory, economic efficiency endorses the claim that "law should be made to conform as closely as possible with the dictates of wealth maximization.":\/ By contrast to economic efficiency theories, communitarian theories are committed neither to the concept of wealth maximization nor to marginalist models of thinking. Instead, these theories seek to promote social solidarity by inculcating certain qualities and ideas that are deemed virtuous. Because communitarian theories put a premium on forming better communities and enhancing certain values, for the communitarian the individual is not the focal point, but is rather a repository of the interests of the community.
Although the two theories differ widely, they do have something in common. Neither economic efficiency nor communitarianism takes individual rights seriously. Both theories are willing to accommodate individual rights only to the extent that doing so will promote the values these theories seek to advance. Neither theory accords independent weight to rights, and both maintain that individuals can be used to advance the interests of others without securing right holders' consent. Economic efficiency sacrifices individual rights on the altar of wealth maximization. Communitarianism is prepared to sacrifice the interests and rights of the individual to promote communitarian values. Both economic efficiency and communi- tarianism violate the Kantian impe rative to treat rational individuals as ends in th emselves and not mere ly as means. :' .K In the following paragraphs I will explore both the theoretical a nd the practical merits of th e various acco unts whi ch suggest that fair use should be grounded in eco nomic efficie n cy or co mmunitarian principles. In evalua ting each ,·iew I will foc us on three qu es tions: Is it theoretically coherent? Can it possibly be applied by co urts to d ecide fair use cases? Does it ex plain prnailing legal practices?
A. Eco nomic Effi c ien cy
American co pyright law has a utilitarian hue .:' ·9 Th e utilitarian view of copyright is sustained by the constitutional lang uage and is widely shared by copyright scholars. ·1° Non et heless, two points bear emph asis: First, the doctrin e of fair use is a judicial creati o n that evolved by a process of accretion independently of th e constitutional text. Second, nothing in the constitutional text or the statutory wording supports the extension of the utilitarian view to the fair use doctrine. 4 1 Th e last point merits elaboration. Judge Leva!, for one, argues that the first statutory factor, which looks to whether th e use is productive or transformative, countenances a utilitarian construction of the fair use doctrin e : l2 This argument is flawed , however. Transformative or productive uses may result in improved , unchanged, or diminished utility. Consider, for example, the case of vitriolic reviews of books or movies. Doubtless, such reviews are transformative, yet the harm they cause to the author of the reviewed work can outweigh the benefits they generate. The converse is also true. Untransformative reproductions of works can sometimes be socially important. This holds true when the original work has not been published or has been kept away from the public 1~ Nor does the fourth statutory factor-the effect of th e second use on the pote ntial market for the original work-point to utilitarianism. The sale of unauthorized copies of a copy- 40. Sel', t'.g., LeYa l, sujna note 2; Fisher, supm note 10 ; a nd Gordon, Fair Use, sufna note 10. However, J e r e my \1\'alclron ohserYes that "rilt seems psyc hologicallv unavoidable that rights g rounde d in utility will be taken as ends in themse lYes: too mu ch emphasis on th e utilitari an character of the pre mises ca n und ermin e people 's sense that it is a right (as o pposed , say, to some defeasible presum pti on or rul e o f thumb) that is ground eel in thi s ,,·ay. "Je remy Waldron, Rn. 842, 8:JJ (1993 (S.D.N.Y 1968) , wh e re the public inte rest in ha1·in g as mu ch infor111ati on as possible on the assassinati o n or President Kenn edY \l·ei ghecl h c~\\·ill' in L\\or o [ ~dlolling th e in cu rporaLi o n or unique pictures of the murd e r in a hook on that subject; ({{so We inreb, .1ujm1 n o te l , at II :13.
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righted work may, in some cases, enhance social we lfare by reducing the market price of the work. E\·en so, the sale of such copies would be regarded as unfair under the fourth factor since it would adversely affect the potential market for the original work. The fourth factor is concerned solely with the distributive effects of a fair use finding.
Neve rtheless, two comprehensive accounts that ground fair use in economic efficiency can be found in the academic literature. The first is advanced bv vVendv Gordon and th e second bv William Fisher.
' ' '
Fair Use as i'vfadwt Failure
vVendy Gordon suggests that courts should "see k[] a base for fair use in structural and economic considerations. "-H She begins with the paradigm of the perfect market. 4 5 vVhen markets are perfectly competitive, resources gravitate through consensual exchanges to their highest value users, and efficiencv is therebv maximized. In the real world , however, the conditions of
perfect markets cannot be satisfied; thus, markets arc fraught with imperfections, or as Gordon, following conventional discourse, calls them, "market failures." When the market fails one can no longer rely on consensual exchange to result in the socially desirable allocation of resources. ·Hi Therefore, Gordon concludes that in the presence of market failures, courts should promote efficiency by emulating the perfectly competitive markets. That is, they should vest the legal right in the party who would have acquired it through the market if it had been feasible. By the same token, the doctrine of fair use should be employed to correct for market failures. Namely, courts should award fair use whenever the second use is socially desirable.-±7 Gordon then crafts a three-step test for recognizing when fair use should be awarded: (l) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is socially desirable [i.e., results in a net gain in social value]; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner.-lR
The first problem with Gordon's account concerns her understanding of efficiency. Although some economists define efficiency abstractly, others, like James Buchanan, insist that the notion of economic efficiency has to be defined relative to a particular institutional framework. 49 17, 19 ( 196: 2) ('To argue that an exi sting order is 'imperfect' in com pari son with an a! ternati\·e order of affairs that turns out upon careful inspecti o n to be unatlainahlc may not he diffe rent from arguing that the c:-.:isting ord e r is pe rfect''); . 1 ulcs L. Coleman , Risks .·\:\ll \\'rzo:\cs 87-1 02 (l9Sl2 ) [hereinafter: Coleman : Ri sks a nd Wrongsl: :Vlurph\· and C:okman, sujno note c'.8 , conditions. H ence , the o utco m e of vo lun tar y exchange in a market like ours , which is ridden with transaction costs an d imperfections, is as efficie nt as the o utco m e of a similar exchange under pe rfec t mark e t co nditi o n s. Bot h outc omes a re effici e nt. If th e Buchanan view is th e right o ne , the quest for efficiency is frivolous and the e ntire doctrin e of fa ir use is un prin cipled for it on ly ac ts to redistribute wealth from o rig inal auth o rs to subsequent u se rs. so Becau se th e debate abo u t th e correc t unde rstanding of efficiency h as n ever been se ttl ed , I will proceed to examin e the th ree conditi o ns of Go rdon 's tes t.
a. i'vfadwt failure. The first conditio n th at h as to be m e t is prese nc e of a marke t fa ilure. In h e r article, Go rd o n id e ntifies thre e types of m arket failures th at plagu e the market for copyrighted works: a nti-disse min a tion motives, p ositive externalities, and transactio n costs.s l T h e first m a rket failure id e ntified by Gordon results fr om an ti-dissemin ati on motives. According to Gordon, the problem of anti-disse min a tion m o tives arises whenever a copyright owner is disposed to forgo a n economic gain in order to retain control over the flow of the informatio n that is embodied in his or h e r work. 52 Although it is true that sometimes co pyright owners m ay be so disposed, a nti-disse min ation motives by themselves are simply not a m arket failure. A market failure occurs when a u ser who values an asse t m o re than its owner cannot secure it through a voluntar y exchange. Becau se it is a consequentialist th eor y, economic effi cien cy is concerned exclusively with outcomes. It does n ot inquire into the motives of th e tra nsactors. Accordingly, th e anti-dissemin ation motives of the cop yrig ht own er are irrelevant. No infere nces as to th e relative value to the owner o f th e copyright, o n the one h an d, an d the seco nd use r and society, on th e other, can be drawn from the refusal of th e owner to disseminate one' s work. If the benefit the owner derives fr om keeping th e work to oneself exceeds the combin ed benefits of th e second user and the public at larg e, the own er should re tain th e work.
The second market failure m en tion e d by Gordon is positive exte rnalities.S3 As Gordon correctly observes, the info rm a tion contained in intellec- 603-4 (1987) ("In fac t a fu ndamenta l theorem of economics is that every society with a given am o unt o f r eso urces fa ces a m u ltipli city of e conomically effi cient sta tes from which to choose; th e parti cul ar e ffici e nt sta te towa rd which soci ety gravi tates refle c ts that soc ie ty's value").
50. Th is applie s with equal vigor to Fi sher' s ac count th a t will be discusse d b e low; see tex t acco mpanying notes 75-82. 5 1. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 10, at 1627-?>5. tual works confe rs benefits not on ly on purch asers but a lso on third parti es. In te llectual works stimulate d e bate and discussion , which benefit th e entire cornmun iry. s-r Neverthel ess, eco nomists note that th e problem of externaliti es on its own is hardly compelling.:'l:J Nor do es it necessarily call for inte n e ntion in the market.S6 \Nh e n transaction costs ar e low and prope rty rights are well defined , th e proble m of extern al ities simply docs n ot arise .s7 But eve n concedin g th at th e existe nce of ex te rn al benefits is a marke t failure thatjustifies inte rve ntion , it re mains uncl ear how awarding fair use h e lps co mbat the probl e m. The solution to th e p roble m of externalities is inte rnalization. Intern ali za tion can be achieved e ith er by governm e nt interv e ntion :,fl or, when transactio n costs are low, by private n egotiations be twe e n the affected parti e s. :-i~1 In the copyright contex t, the internaliza tion of ex te rn al benefits th at authorship generates can be accomplish ed by subsidiza tion of authorship and other creative activiti es. The doctrin e of fair use, h o· weve r, is an in adequate m eans for subsidizing authorship. A fair use award can be viewed as a subsidy to subsequent authors at the expe nse of previous o n es.6° But, absent empirical evidence to th e contrary, th e be n efits that subsequent authors reap from the existence of the doctrine might b e outweighed by the h arms suffered by original authors. Therefore, as b etween authors the impact of the fair use doctrin e as a m eans of subsidizin g auth orship is indeterminate. It should be emphasized, though, that th e fair u se privilege extends not o nly to authors but also to a vast number of u se rs who are not engaged in authorship or creative activi ty of any sort, and it allows them to avail th emselves of existing inte llectual works without comp e n sating the authors of th ese works. Conseque ntly, for users who are not auth ors, the fair privilege creates opportunities for "free-riding." Thus, in the final tally, it appears that the fair use doctrin e may well be ill-suited to internalize the external effects of authorship and creativity.
The third type of poten ti al market failure is high transaction costs. That high transaction costs stifle the effective operation of markets for inte ll ec-54. To d e te rmine whether copyright protection generates ex te rna l costs and ex te rn a l be n efits, we first have to clearly define th e terms "cost" and "ben efit. " For an illuminating discussion of th e subject see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, ivfisrhief and J'vii,fortzuu tual works is indisputable . In sofar as copyrighted works are conce rn ed, th e cost of consummating a mark e t transacti on ofte n exceeds by far th e valu e of the co pyrighted material to the po tenti al user. Moreove r, high m o nitoring and litigati on cos ts preclud e authors from e nforcing their le gal rights against infringers. Howeve r, th e problern o f transaction cost is not impregn able. A possi ble soluti on to the problem of transaction costs comes in th e form of technological innovatio ns . Paul Goldste in reports that in the near future n ew technol ogies will substan ti a lly reduce negotiation costs b e tween authors and users. Moreover, they vvill also allow authors to police unauthorize d users and exclude nonpayers . He sugges ts that in light of this techn ological revolution , the fa ir use d oc trin e should be abrogated, or, at a minimum, be con strued ve r y narrowly.hl A diffe rent solution to the transaction cost proble m is the formati o n of legal institutio ns th a t act to reduce transaction costs and streamlin e transactions. In the fi eld of copyright law th ese functions are performed by institutions such as ASCAP and CCC. 6~ These institutions comba t th e proble m of transac tion costs in two diffe rent ways. First, by creating pools of co pyrighted works63 th ey allow licensees to pay a prede termined fee and in return gain access to an entire repertoire of protected works without additional charges. Second , by collectively e nforcing the rights of authors against infringers they economize on policing and litigation costs. 54 Therefore , in the presen ce of such institutions the question for proponents oflaw and economics is not wh e n fair use should be awarded, but rather, why have th e fair use doctrin e at a ll?65
More astounding is th e fact that not only law and economics proponents but virtually all commenta tors seem to agree that, absent transaction costs, fa ir use should be abolished. 6 ti In effec t, th ey all suggest th a t authors' ability to charge should be th e test for fair use: Wh en authors can charge for 6 1. Goldstein , Co pyright 's Highway, .1 ujmL note 39, a t 223-24; see alw Paul Goldstein , CojJ)'-right in the New !njimnation Age, 40 C.-\TH. U. L. R. 829, 829 (1991) [h e reinafte r: Goldstein , Copyright in th e New Inform ation Age ].
62. ASCAP, th e Am e ri ca n Society of Compose rs Authors and Publish e rs, is a copyright co llective that license s rights fo r publi c p erform ance of m usical works. CCC, the Copyright Clearing h o use Center, li censes the right to re produce literary works. For a compre h e nsive review see David Si n acore-Guinn , Col.l.ECTI\'E ADMlNISTR.\TI ON or COPWI GHT .-\ N D NE IGH BORlNG RIGHTS (1993) .
63 . To becom e m embe rs in such in stitu tio ns , cr eators o ught to assi g n the rig hts to their wo rks to th e in stitution a nd a u thori ze it to li ce nse th e wo r ks as it sees fit. REv. 1293 REv. ( 1996 .
65 . This is because the e xiste nce of the fa ir use doctrin e threa tens to thwart the effective operation o f copyri g ht co llectives like ASCAP a nd CCC. Indeed, if fa ir u se is to be awarde d too ge nerously, copyright co ll ec ti ves wi II be un able to co ll ect an v revenu es as users will a lways resort to fa ir usc argum ents to avoid payin g. 66. Sr•r', r.g., Go ldstein , Copvrig ht 's Highway, sujml n o te 39, at :223-24; Dratler, sujna note 32, a t 294 (" It makes no sense to prm·idc a fa ir usc su bsicly to a use r II' h e n a li ce nse cou ld be ctfic ien tly negotia ted "); also A1neri ca n G eo physi ca l Lin ion v. subsequent uses, fair use should never be granted. This test , however, is extremely odd, as the ability to charge by itself cannot possibly determine lega l rights. A hoodlum might have the ability to charge protection fees from businesses, and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a right to do that. Similarly, I may be able to sell to you a car that does not belong to me, but it does not follow that I am justified in so doing. Absent an underlying theory of rights, the ability to charge is normatively meaningless. Therefore, to suggest that fair use is nothing but a means to overcome the problem of transaction costs is misconceived and ill-founded.
Champions of economic efficiency will invariably disapprme of the above analogies. After all, from an economic standpoint, the point and purpose of copyright protection is to secure sufficient returns to creative authorship, and if the fair use doctrine vitiates this goal it should simply be abolished, and authors should be entitled to charge for each and every use of their works. The problem with this argument is that it cannot be sustained by any empirical evidence. Prior to the introduction of any farreaching changes in the existing copyright system it is useful to recall George Priest's quintessential caveat that "[i]n the current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property. "67 Therefore, the claim that the abolition of the fair use doctrine will enhance social welfare is merely an assumption that cannot support an adequate basis for normative recommendations. Furthermore, the abolition of fair use may not even be in the best interest of authors. As William Landes and Richard Posner point out, previously produced works act as raw materials in the production of new works; thus, the elimination of fair use will make copyrightable works more costly to produce.68 This leads them to the conclusion that from the point of view of authors, optimal copyright protection should be weaker than complete. Therefore, the call for abolishing the fair use doctrine is problematic even when viewed through the lens of economic efficiency.
b. Desirability of the transfer. According to Gordon the second condition that must be met is that an award of fair use should effect net social gain. To determine whether this condition is satisfied the courts are required to weigh the loss to the original author and to similarly situated authors against the gains of the second user and society as a whole. It is questionable, however, that courts are capable of conducting this cost-benefit analy- sis. 1 i' 1 Practicability h ;ts been , a nd still remains, the proverbial Achill es' h ee l of law and eco nomi cs. In th e case at hand , three uniqu e features make a cost-benefit calc ulus es pecially diffi c ult. First, intell ec tual works involve an e mo tio nal dim ension that can not be assessed in monetary terms. Second, courts a re required to ,·alue the social gain (or loss) not only to th e parti es in th e case but also to the public at large. Third, co urts must m easure the losses (or gains) of potential authors who are similarl;' situated to the plaintiff in the case at bar. The qu estio n is: Can \Ve practically expect courts to p erfo rm this calculus successfully? I am afraid that this questi on should be answered negativeh'. vVhen th e interests of so many third parties are involved, even a rough cost-benefit a nalysis is simply impracticable.
Th e impracticability problern cuts much deeper, for it is the second users, not th e courts, who are supposed to perform this calculus in the first place. It is unrealistic to suggest that users will b e able to imm erse themse lves in this intricate calculus when ever th ey have to d ecide wh e ther to use a copyrighted work. Therefore, efficiency cannot guide courts and use rs through the fair use maze.
c. The substantial injlll} limitation. Gordon's third condition-that the fair use award will not result in substantial injury to the a uthor-appears either otiose or incongruent with her framework of analysis. From an efficiency point of view, the injury to the original author has no importance per se. Obviously, it is a factor that must be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis, but on its own, th e injury to th e original author is not determinative. If, however, this condition carries independent clout one should wonder how it squares with the underlying goal of economic analysis. Gordon elucidates the need for this limitation:
Th e substantial injury hurdle serves several functions. First, it preserves the incentive syste m at the core of copyright. Second, it refl ects a recognition that judgments courts make about whether a defendant's use is value maximizing are rough approximations . . . . Third, awarding copyright ovvners a veto wh enever their injur y is substantial gives some guarantee that th e fair use system will not put them at an intolerable disadvantage./0
The inclusion of th e third condition not only injects vagueness into Gordon's account but also renders it somewhat incoherent. If economic efficiency should be th e benchmark in fair use cases, then the third condition is a non sequitur. If, on the other hand, economic analysis cannot unravel the fair use puzzle, why should courts follow Gordon's recommendation to look to principles of economic efficiency? For if the rights of authors and b9 . For a normati1·e di scussion of the institutional aspects of law ancl e con omi cs , srP.Jul es L. Co lem an , !jfirim ry. Utility a nd 1\' m/th Mrnimizotion. i1 Hmsm.\ L. RE\. 509, : "'>4Sl ( 1980) (a rg-uin g that ew~n if economic eflic ienc1· should be maximized it cloes not follow th;ll courts ;mel agents should act to t hi . -; effect '' i thou t "'a further theory of institutional co m pctcncc '").
70. Conlon , F;1ir Lise . . llljmln o te I 0, ar Hi 19 (footnotes omitted).
copyright owners trump effic ie ncy conside rati o n s, th e n a normative justificatio n for the doctrine sh o uld be so ught in theori es of j ustice , not economi c efficie ncvJl I Gordon's acc ount is in te nsion with itself. Its b asic normative fram ework is problematic ancl inadequate lv motivated. Moreover, it fails to accoun t for th e fu ll range of existing lega l practices .
To b e sure, Gordon makes a limited claim for the capacity of her view to explain ex isting practices. Sh e does n o t cl a im that her view co mports perfectly with the case law. Ind ee d , sig nific ant portions of the existing law cannot be reconciled with her framewo rk. Three examples stand out: protection of unpublished works, parodies and reviews. U ncler the existing law, th e unpublish ed nature of the work militates strongly against a fair u se findi ng. 7'2 Such works gen e rate no soc ial utility, but nonetheless they enjoy a high er degree of protection. Often publication of suc h works against th e own er's will might enhance soc ial welfare. Accordin gly, th e attitude of courts toward unpublish ed wo rks cannot be exp lain ed on efficiency grounds. 73 Reviews and parodies g ive rise to a different problem. Sarcastic reviews and parodies usually inf1i ct an irreparable h arm upon creators and mi ght undermine their in ce ntive to produce inte ll ectual works in th e future.'-+ Such reviews and p arodies vary enormously in their importance to society depending on th ei r conte nt, and, as such, they may not enha n ce social welfare enough to offset the obvious and large costs they impose . Neverth eless, there is littl e doubt that such uses are fair.
The Ince· ntive/Loss Ratio
Like Gordon , ·william Fisher also touts economic efficie ncy as a possibl e solution to the existing fair use quandary. Unlike Gordon, however, Fish er do es not claim that the existing case law is defensible on efficiency grounds.
Indeed, Avery Katz concludes in a recent article that
Modern Neoclassical welfare economics ne,·er was suited to the task of co n structi ng a normative ord er for law. A normative con cept [of econom ic efficiency] rooted in positivism and not even regarded as decisive in th e h o m e field [i.e., econom ics] h ardly co uld serve as an organizing co ncept ror a separate di sc iplin e [i.e. , law] that traditi o nally trea ted n o rmative analysis as a central part of its task. 79 ( 1992) .
74. Empi ri ca l data in the contex t of libel ac ti o n s suggest that th e m <~j ority of libel ,·ictims beli eve that mon e\' damages cannot make good th e ir injuri es. Twenty p e rcent of th e victims believe that no remedy can aclequate lv redress their h arlll s. Sr'f Re ndall P. Bezanson, .J ohn So loski & Gi lbert Cranberg, L mt-:1 L-111 .·\:\ll THE PRESS !Vl\"n-1 .\0/ll RL\l. ITY l-28 ( 1987) . Alfred Yen mainta in s that these findin gs can be extende d to authors wh ose works han: been parodied or ktrshh· rcvie11-ed. Alfred C. \ en, \\ hm ,·\uihurs \\i!ll. Moreover, believing that th e prese nt state of' affairs is beyond repa ir h e sets o u t to reconstruc t th e fair u se doc trin e acco rdin g to efficiency cons ideration s. Th e co re of Fi sh e r 's e nte rprise is th e in centive / loss ratio , wh ich he offers as a benchmark for fai r use cases. 7 · 1 Basically, th e incentive / loss ratio is a sophisticate d way of co nducting a cos t-be nefit an a lysis . T h e numerato r o f this fr action represe nts the monetary ret urn the origin al auth or could reap if th e use in ques tio n we re h eld unfair and the auth o r could charge payme nt for any such use. The d e nominator represents the resultin g lo ss to soc iety from granting the auth or exc lusivity m·er the relevant use./6 Put simply, the tes t co mpares potential loss to t h e au th or against the po ten tial loss to so cie ty. So far, Fisher's test is quite similar to Gordon 's second co n clition. He parts compa ny with Go rdon in re quiring courts not to confine th emse lves to th e case at h and but rath e r to co n sid er all the possible uses of a copyrighted wo rk in deciding a specifi c fair use case . In othe r wo rds, Fish e r dema nds that courts "determine th e unive rse of activiti es vis-a-vis" the original work that might be con sidere d in fr inging./ 7 For example, if a detective stor y can be the subj ec t of a book review, a parody, a computer game, and a musical, courts must conside r all the se activities in eve r y fai r use case that invo lves this story. Then courts should d evise an in cen tive/ loss ratio for every such use and by ranking the various ratios d ecide which ac tiviti es should b e deeme d fa ir and which should notJR Although Fish e r's account is cohe rent, it is d esperately impracticable . Th e doubts abo ut th e practicability of this view are best expressed by Fisher himself:
If such a comparative analysis must be employed in m ost cases, is n ot economic analysis in this doctrinal con text hope lessly imp racticable? The discussio n of the highly stylized case presente d in sec ti on B was comp lex enough . If we removed the simplifying assumptions , limi ted judge's investigatory power, an d burdened him with other cases, it wendel be ludicrous, surely, to ask him to undertake an inquiry like the o n e o utline d above. Pe rh aps. It is hard to imagin e a judge making even rough guesses at some of the figures critical to the calculus./9
In sum , Fisher's account is a stimulating thought experim ent that d e monstrates the analytical vigor of economic analysis a longside the diffi culties involved in applying econ o mic principles to real-wo rld situatio ns. Specificall v, Fisher suggests tha t cachjudge, after dn·isi ng an in centive / loss ratio for eac h putati\el y in fr in ging use , sh o uld arrange the \·ariou s uses o n th e X-axis in orde r of th e ir ratios ancl th e rc1ft cr pl ot a grap h of th e "[n] et imp act on eco nomi c effi cie ncy of forbidding eac h su ccessive use ." Based o n this graph, th e judge has to dete r mine the usc at \l·h ich the nct-cfficienc\· cun·c peaks a nd th en declare all th e tt scs LO the ri g ht oft hi s p oi nt bir. a nd a ll the uses to th c left uf th is point u n f~1ir. Fo r a gra ph ic d i llusll ~tti on oft his cl(ct erm i nation , Sl 'l' irl. at 17 Hi.
79. /d. a t l 7 1S.
One last point on fair use and economic <malvsis bears emphasis. The existing attempts to justif)' the fair use doctrine on economic efficiency grounds are somewhat peculiar. The fair use doctrine establishes a strict ''all or nothing" legal rule. The existing rule offers two extreme options: If a use is fair, the second user can m·ail herself of it without compensating the original author; if it is not, the second use will be enjoinecl. 00 In both cases someone is harmed. A fair use finding inflicts harm on the original author;sl an injunction deprives society of useful knowledge. In the context of copyright law, it appears that economic efficiency could have been better served had the fair use doctrine taken the middle ground by allowing second users to use the original work and then compensate its author. Put differently, in a market so rife with transaction costs and imperfect information , liability rules would probably outperform property rules in terms of enhancing economic efficiency.1-1'2 Thus, economic analysis is at a loss to explain why compensation should not be avvarded in fair use cases.
B. Communitarianism
A different approach to the fair use problem is presented by proponents of communitarianism. Bv their li£hts, courts must turn to communitv interests should focus the fair use inquiry on the public interest, namely the community interest.S~'l Accordingly, whenever an intellectual work is of considerable value to the community, courts should employ the fair use doctrine to make it available for the public. In other words, the greater the importance of a work to the community, the weaker its copyright protection.s4 In Lacey's view, the fair use doctrine should serve as a vehicle for taking from creators 80. Under the tvpolot,ry of Calahresi and Melamed , the fair use doctrine constitutes a property rule, or at least a \·ariant thereof. Under their definition, a right is protected by a propertv rule when a transfer of an entitlement requires the ex-ante consent of the holder thereof. Liability rules protect entitlements by granting the owner a claim for compensation whenever the value of the entitlements is diminished by the actions of other people . . ' 1089 (1972) [hereinafter: Calabresi and ::VIelamed] .
81. The public also suflers an indirect loss when f~1ir use is awarded because any such award-by the lights of economic analysis-aclyersely impacts the incentive of the original author to create in the future.
82. For many years law and economics literature has suggested that wh e n transaction costs are high , liabilitY rules are superior to property rules. Sre, r.g a nd giving to th e publi c with o ut even co mp ensatin g aut hors for th e ir losses. This view g ives rise to a variety of proble m s. Firs t, h er a pp roach is unp r in cip led . In h er view, th e in te rest of suhse que n t use rs o f in tell ectual goo d s and th e public at la rge should preva il over th e interests of origi nal a u th o rs, but abse nt an account o Cwh:· this should be , the re co mrn e ndation canno t sta nd . vVhy should a uth ors surrende r th e ir rights, inte res ts, a nd tal e nts to adva nc e the inte rests of th e public: Why sh o uld they no t, a t ami nim um, b e corn pe nsate d fo r their labor? Lac ey atte mpts to an swe r th ese qu es tion s by arguin g that the assum ptio n that auth o rs expec t re muneration is flaw ed, but th e evidence she provides to support this claim is inadequate. At best, h e r argum e nt proves th at wh en they make the d ec isio n to create, some creators e xpect to be rewa rded whil e o th e rs do n o t.~'' But e\·e n co n cedin g that some auth o rs are n ot moved b y finan cial reason s, we still mig h t ·wa nt to co mpe nsate them on gro unds ofbirness-whatever their exp ec ta tion s. Th e refore, her a rgum e nt cannot carry the day.
Sec ond , Lacey's view is susceptibl e to th e copyright paradox. Although Lacey's approac h mig ht promote th e disse min ation of kn owledge in the short run , it will likely de crease, o r in the extreme elimin a te, the dissemination of knowledge in th e lo n g r un. For if auth ors care about th e ir own fin ancial we lfare th ey will put th eir creative efforts to rest. This, in turn, will lead to a dramatic d ec rease in th e amount a nd quality of inte llectual works avail able to the public. Thus, Lacey's en terprise might harm the very inte rest it see ks to pro tect.
Finally, Lacey assigns to the courts the rol e of d eciding wh at works are of social impo rtan ce . But how are the courts to make this determination? H ow does one recognize an importa nt intellectual work? In an oft-ci te d p aragraph, Justice Holmes warned th a t "[i] t would b e a dangerous und ertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute th e mselves fin al judges of the worth of pictorial illustratio ns, outsid e of th e n arrowest and most obvious limits. "Rti T his warning applies with equal force to other copyrightabl e works. Lacey h erself offers ver y littl e guidance on this matte r. Sh e asserts th at "political informa tion which con tributes to th e deba te about the very nature of o ur government and its p olici es, is of grea test valu e to a com muni ty. "i">7 This on its own is n o t very helpfu l. Th e reafter, Lacey co ntends th at the Supreme Court was clearly wro ng in holding th at off-the-air video taping constitutes fa ir use .Rs This state ment begs the questio n. Television program s o ften provide large a m o unts of political and otherwise valuable information. The availability of video tapes of television program s sure ly contributes to the wide dissemination of importan t info rmation , as it m akes these programs ava ilable to 85 . frl . at. J:J72. The d ata La cey o ffers suggest that 70 per cent o f th e a uth o rs \\'llo p ubli shed at least o ne book are e n gage d in a nother 1mrk oth e r tha n writin g . No infe re n ces ca n be m a de base d o n th ese data as to what impels a u tho rs to create . Th e usc of th ese d a ta to su pport the a rgume nt that auth o rs d o no t expect monctan· IT\,·ards is hi gh h" inad equ;1t e.
sn. Blci ste in ,._ Do n a l d~on Li thograp hi c Co. , 188 U.S. 2:-\ll ( 1 90c~).
87. Lac ev, sujmt no te 1 J , at 1:)88 .
88. !d. at 1:)91. more viewers. vVhy, then, was the Supreme Court wrong? My point here is not that the Supreme Court was right, but rather that deciding what is important is completely idiosyncratic. It involves a value judgment that courts are ill-fitted to make. 1 Nithout an objective benchmark, which Lacey fails to provide, courts will face tremendous difficulties deciding uses of what works are to be considered fair. Also, the importance criterion will likely spur enormous confusion among users. At bottom, recourse to cornmunitarian values cannot solve the fair use problem. vVithout a further theory, there is no apparent justification to prefer the interests of the community over the rights of the individuals. Moreover, Lacey's attempt to foster wider dissemination of knowledge runs aground as it is subject to the proverbial copyright paradox. Hence, her approach is , at least to some extent, incoherent. Finally, the benchmark of importance is too vague and subjective, and thus provides almost no guidance as to how to determine what uses should be regarded fair.
Ill. RIGHTS, FAIR USE, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

A. Rights and Fairness
To get a handle on the fair use problem, it is useful to begin with a rightsbased theory of copyright law-that is, a theory that treats rights in intellectual works seriously. A copyright is a property right in original works of authorship. That the author has a property right in her works is of both normative and moral significance. The defining characteristic of rights is that they erect moral barriers that others are not at liberty to cross.SSJ Robert Nozick, for instance, refers to rights as "side constraints" that "reflect the underlying K:1.ntian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means. "90 Ronald Dworkin characterizes rights as "political trumps held by individuals" that protect individuals from unbridled pursuit of collective goals.9l Indeed, according to the liberal tradition, the point and purpose of rights is to demarcate a domain of autonomy and control.92 Rights command respect even when doing so would preclude the attainment of otherwise desirable consequences. Thus, as David Lyons points out "[i]f one accepts moral rights, one cannot accept absolute guidance by welfare arguments."93 The same holds true for communitarian considerations. Accotdingly, rights in intellectual property cannot be constrained just because doing so will enhance overall welfare or promote communitarian values.94 My point here is not that con-89. Loren E. Lomsky, Rights without Stilts, 12 l-IAR\'. J. L. & P u B. POI:\' 775, 777 ( 1989) . Ser also DaYicl Lyons, Utility and Rights, 24 Nm.tos 107, 111 ( 1982 ( 1 980) ("the L1i r usc cloctri ne is not a license straints on rights in works of authorship are n everjustifiable , but rath e r that such co nstraints must b e rooted in con sid e rati o ns that respect rights. That is, constraints of rights must be d efe nd e d in te rms of fairness. This, afte r all , is why copyright law allows a "fair use" exce ption and n o t an "e fficient use " or a "community b e nefit" e xcep tio n. Impli citly, co pvright law re cognizes that to the exte nt that rights can be co nstrain e d, th e legitim acy of d o ing so is a matte r of fa irness.
In th e following sections I d evelop a con ce pt of fair use tha t is sustainable on grounds of fairness and is, thus, co mpatibl e with a rights-based view of copyright law. Since I mainta in that th e fair use do ctrine h as always been , and still is, in extricably relate d to th e conce pt of corre ctive justice, I begin my exposition by explaining th e dem ands of corrective justice .
Th e basic ri ghts in property are typi call y p e rceive d as th e domain of distributive justice . vVe turn to di stributive justi ce to d e termine wheth e r our holdings are fair. But whether or not th ey are fair, we re cognize the n ee d for a distinction b e twe en legitimate and ill egitima te ways of moving resources around . Even if the existing allocation of resources is not perfectly compatible with any scheme of distributive justice, th e law will not tolerate certain involuntary takings of property. After all, the ve r y conce pt of property implies security against the actions of others. Property restricts the freedom of others and limits the ways in which resources can be transferre d. To determine how property can b e legitimately transferre d we have norms governing transfer, taking, or use. These are the norms of transactional justice, which includes corrective justice. These norms not only d e termin e the legitimate ways of transferring resources but also what ought to b e done about transfers that are illegitimate. Th erefore, these norms e nsure respect for rights in that they protect rights against illegal transfers. So , th e concept of property rights invariably invokes the ide a of corrective justice. But to give corre ctive justice a meaning we need an account of what makes a taking or a transfer illegitimate . That is what the principle of reciprocity of risk provides.
B. Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice
Corrective justice is concerne d with re ctification of losses that are brought about by private wrongs. By contrast, distributive justice is concerne d with the ge neral allotment of entitlements, resources, a nd opportunitie s. Accordingly, corrective justice gives rise to an age nt-specific duty to repair, and distributive justice imposes agent-gen e ral duti es to re pair. 95 fo r a co r po rate th e ft, empowe ring a co urt to ig nore a co pyright wheneve r it determines th e underlyin g work co ntains material o f possibl e public importanc e'' ).
95 . A dutv in corrective justice is age nt-sp ec ifi c because o nl y th e wro ng d oe r, and n o o th e r, is obli ge d to make good th e losses o ne cau se d. A dutY in cli stributi Yejusti cc is agent-ge n e ral in the sense that e\"l:n membe r of so cictv is rc (juircd LO co mply with the cl c mancls of the just a lloca ti o n. Sw p,F nt mfly Co le lll a n ancl Ripstcin , . lujna n o te 54 , at 9 1.
Aristotle was th e first to distin guish betwee n corrective justice a nd distributive ju s tice.~H> In hi s view, however, correc tive justice is in elu ctably re lated to distributive justice. For him the pu rpose of correc tive justice is to restore th e proportionate distribution of entitl ements that existed b e tween the parties before a wrong has occu rred . Thus , the n eed to return to the preexisting e ntitlem e nts imposed a duty to rectify th e loss on th e injurer. The Aristotelian view of co rre ctive justice encounters considerabl e difficulti es in two kinds of situations. First, it does nor account for situations where the loss of the ,·ictim differs from the gain of the injure r.97 Second, and more importantly, in the A.ristotelian view, co rrec tive justice is d evoid of mean in g when the prevailing distribution is incompatible with th e demands of distributive justice. Departures from an unjust di stribution of en titlem ents n ee d not be rec tified as rec tification will only serve to res tore the p reexisting injustice. Thus, th e Aristoteli a n view fail s to provide a n adequate moral basis for the legal duty imposed on injure rs to make good th e losses th ey caused.
A diffe re nt view of corrective justice is assoc iated with Jules Cole man. In Coleman's view, the purpose of correc tive justice is to sustain real rights. Rights are real, and h ence sustainable by corrective justi ce, if they "are worthy of protection against infringem e nt by th e actions of others," even if th ey are not defensible within the best scheme of distributive justice.9S The right to improve upon the existing allocation of reso urces is reserved to the state-not to individuals. Thus, the existing allocation of rights should only be sufficiently defensible on grounds of distributive justice to warrant defense against individual infringeme nts.99 For Coleman , corrective justice is in a sense "tran sactional justice" as it ac ts to protect against violations of th e prevailing tra nsactional norms.IOO In that capacity the role of co rrec tive justice is to ensure that resources are transfe rred in ways that are compatible with the relevant norms of the specific co mmunity. The point of corrective justice, acco rding to Coleman, is not to restore the preexisting allocation of reso urces but rather to ann ul the distortions caused by wrongful or unjust transfers.IOl The importance of Coleman's view lies in the fact that it provides a m oral basis for many of the existing legal practices, while the Aristotelian view fails to do so. Consequ ently, the following analysis is based o n Coleman's view of correc tive justice . C. Th e Scop e of COITective Ju stic e a nd Copy 1 ·ight lnf1·in geme nts
Correc ti ve justi ce gene rates a duty to rep a ir wro ngful losses. In Cole man 's lexi co n, losses are wro ngful when they are the res ult of wrong or wrongdoin g.lo:z ·wrongdoing occ urs wh en ever som eone impe rmissibly and unjustifiably h a rm s the leg itimate inte rests of oth e rs .
1 0 :~ vVrongs co n sist of actions th at h a rm o r invade rights , regardl ess of whether the co nduct that cause d th e h a rm is wrong in itse lf. 10 · 1 Thus, eve n in pri va te n ecessity cases, the injure r has to re ctify th e losses h e or sh e imposed on the \·ictim.w:o In Cole man's view, a person who in order to save h e r own life bre aks into so meo ne e lse's h o u se will h ave to compe n sa te the own e r for a n y losses. Rende ring co mp ensa tion is a way of acknowl ed ging a nd resp ecting the righ ts of others.l 0 l1
Unde r this se t of d efiniti o ns a copyright infringement falls in th e ca tegory of wro ngs. As Justice Story stated in Folsom, " [ t] he e ntirety of copyright is the proper ty of the author, " 107 and, h e nce , it is no different from real pro perty. lOt\ Gen erally, eve ry un authorize d taking of priva te prope rty!09 is a violation of th e owner' s right. Unauthorized taking o f inte llectual materia ls constitutes a copyright infringeme nt. By ava iling h e rself of a copyrighted work, the infringer violates the prope rty right of its author an d, as is the case with real property, a copyright infringeme nt gives the author a claim to rep ai r in corrective justice against the infringer. This moral claim to make repai r translates into a legal claim in torts. Rec ast in legal terms, an unauthorized use of copyrighted works is generally a tort that e n titles the mvner to legal remedics.11o This basic principle was clearly articulated by Lord Chancellor Elden in i'vlmuan v. Tegg, who stated that ''he who has made an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the consequences of so doing. '' 111 Ye t, in copyright law, not e\·erv unauthorized use of a copyrighted work constitutes an infringement. Unauthorized uses that come under the aegis of L1ir use are specifically excused by the Copyright Act. Fair unauthorized uses are noninfringing. But 1vhat distinguishes unauthorized fair uses from unfair ones? v'vl1y should the latter be regarded as wrongs while the former should not? Is this distinction justified in corrective justice? I posit that these difficulties can be resolved only bv recourse to the paradigm of reciprocity of risk that underlies the fair use doctrine.
D. The Paradigm of Reciprocity of Risk
The paradigm of the reciprocity of risk is generally associated with George Fletcher.! I:! For Fletcher the nature of the risk that agents impose on each other is the benchmark of liability. Central to his scheme is the distinction between reciprocal and nonreciprocal risks. Under this paradigm, liability in torts attaches whenever a harm results from a nonreciprocal risk taking by the injurer where the injurer has no excuse for taking the risk. I L) A risk is nonreciprocal when the injurer's activity creates an excessive risk of harm relative to the risks the victim imposes on the injurer. Reciprocal risks, by contrast, do not give rise to liability as they offset each other. The test for reciprocity is one of both degree and kind. Nonreciprocal risks differ in degree or kind from the risks prevailing in the relevant community. For example, in a community of motorists, the risk of an automobile accident is reciprocal. By contrast, in a mixed community of motorists and pedestrians, the risk of a car accident between a motorist and a pedestrian is nonreciprocal. In the former case, no liability will attach should the risk materialize; in the latter, the motorist will have a duty to indemnify the pedestrians for the harm she caused them unless she has an excuse. Accordingly, liability in copyright law should arise whenever an unauthorized user imposes a nonreciprocal risk on authors. To determine which risks fall under this category one has to look to the relationship among members of different communities of risk. In the context of copyright law the relevant communities are those of authors and of users (nonauthors). The relevant risk is the one of unauthorized taking. Put this way, it is straightforward that as between authors and users the latter impose a nonreciprocal risk on the former and thus should be held liable for copyright infringement for unau th o riz ed uses of copyrighted works. As betwee n auth o rs, o ne has to turn to the p revailin g norm s a nd custom s of th e relevant community to decid e whi ch unauth orized takings co n stitute reciprocal risks and which do not. T hus, as betwee n au tho rs, h arms that result from reciprocal ri sks should be d ee med fair. Th e preced ing analysis can be enca psu late d in a two-princ ipl e test of fa ir use. T he first principle h o lds that on ly authors, but not copycats, should be entitled to th e fair use privelege . Th e second mainta ins th at, as be tween auth ors, o nly u ses that co mport with th e pre\·ail-ing cu sto n1 ary practices in th e re levant com munity of a uthors sh o uld be regarde d fai r.
Th e first prin ciple, by di stingui shin g be tween different co mmunities of risk, identifies the pote ntial contend ers for f<:1 ir use. The second, by focusing on custo mar y practices and so cial co1wentio ns in the relevant comm uni ty of risk, provides the fine-tuning. Com·e nti o nal no tio ns and local n o rms are pivotal to th e cortce pt of corrective justice .!!-+ Having been crea ted and sustained by behavior, m any of th ese norms and prac tices are n ot o nly fa ir but also effi cien t.ll 5 By gen erati n g expectations-both episte mic an d normative-they form a basis for coordina tion that b enefits th e entire co mmunity. These expec tati o ns provide a basis for individuals to pursue their plans and promote their welfare. Because individuals typically benefit fro m th e existe nce of such n o rms and practi ces, each bears a moral duty to comply with the m and sustain th em eve n in situations where doing so vvill be to one 's detriment.ll6
Th e two-step test proposed here h as several important virtues. First, it provides a principled method of d ec iding fair use cases-one that en han ces both fairness and group efficiency. Second, by sustaining and r e inforcing preva iling expec tations, this test creates a basis for further coordin ation and planning. Finally, this test is relatively easy to apply. It does not require courts to p erform intricate cost-be n efit an alyses. Nor does it require courts to d etermin e the importan ce of various u ses of intellectual works. Courts only need to decide whether a certain use is compatible with th e pertinent conventions an d practices of the relevant com munity. ll7 In so doing, courts can h ar ness th e kn owledge of the litigating parties, who are generally well aware of the content of th e preva iling n orms and practices. To be sure, disputes and disagreements as to th e content of such norms and the exact boundaries set by them will sometimes arise. But based on th e evi den ce adduced bv the parties, courts should be able e<1sily to resolve such disagreements.
IV. APP LICAT ION S
This part sets out to demonstrate hem the suggested fair use test can be squared \\·ith the text of the statu ton prmision and to illustrate its application in \arious cases im·oh·ing the fair use defense. f\Iv contention here is neither that the statutory text was tailored to fit my proposed test nor that courts consistently apply it. I do argue , hmvever, that both the text of section 107 and outcomes of many of the cases echo the two-step test of fair use offered here.
A . The Statutory Text
The preamble of section 107 of the Copyright Act contains a list of illustrative uses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, research, and teaching that might be regarded as fair. All these uses share two common features. They are all referential and , moreover, they are all transfonnative. Central to the very essence of these uses is the principle of drawing upon existing intellectual works in order to create new ones. liS In other words, all those who engage in these activities impose reciprocal risks on each other. Scholars, researchers, commentators, news reporters, teachers, and critics expose each other to risks of the same order. Building upon existing works or at least referring to them is the point and purpose of most of the illustrative uses. It is impossible to imagine a scholarly \vork, research, or review that does not address preexisting works. To be sure, these activities do not require reproduction of copyrighted materials. Necessity hardly ever arises in the context of copyright law. After all, copyright protection subsists in the expression and does not extend to ideas.ll9 Hence, subsequent authors are free to use the underlying ideas of a copyrighted work as long as they do not copy the expression.
Moreover, when there is only a limited number of ways to express an idea, copyright protection will be withheld altogether. 1~0 Commentators, critics, and sc holars are no t co mp ell e d to q uo te copyrigh te d materi als or otherwise re produ ce the m in th eir works, yet th ere is a wi d espread custo m that all ows doi ng that. T h e use of copyrig h te d ma terials le n ds credi b ili ty an d accuracy to th e new wo rks. Ofte n, it is th e m ost effec tiYe wav to create so methi ncr ; D an ew. Virtua ll y all sc h olars qu ote fro m o th er sc h olarl y \\·orks; all research ers make co pies to carry th eir research furth er; and all criti cs make refe ren ce to the works they critici ze . Such use s are san ctio n ed by th e p r evaili ng conve ntion s in th e re levan t co mmunity of risk. T h e o nly use th a t mig h t appear inco n gruent is reproducti o n "of m u ltipl e copies for classroo m u se ." H oweve r, Robe rt Ellickso n re po rts in thi s rega rd that '·p rofessors' substantive no rms see m to permit th e unco n tes ted co pying fo r class u se, year afte r year, of arti cles and mino r portio n s of books. " 1:21 Thus, insofar as th e acad em ic community is co n cern ed , the risk of copying articl es an d min or portions of boo ks m ay b e reciprocal. Bu t the fact that members of th e re le\·ant communities of risk impose o n each o ther ri sks of th e sam e o rder is not en o ugh . T h e risks sh o ul d be also of th e same m agnitude . That is why the illus trative uses are only presumptively fair. For exam p le, I can not copy Coase 's cl assic arti cle 'Th e P roblem of Social Cost," add a concluding remark , and publish itjust by din t ofb ein g an academic. Doing so would violate the p ertinen t prevailing n o rms in th e com m unity of academics. A furth er limiti ng prin ci pl e is required . Hen ce, the fo ur sta tuto ry factors.
The first factor requires courts to consider the purpose and character of the u nauth o rized u se. In con sidering this fac tor, th e premium sh o uld b e put o n the transformative n ature of the subsequen t work. This facto r should be used to distinguish works that involve "intellectual labor and j udgm ent" from mech anical re productio ns of existing works. In effect, this facto r singles out authors and creato rs fr o m copycats. T h e commercial n ature of the subsequent use should b e accorded very little weigh t under the p roposed test. As Justice Souter astutely observed in Campbell, " [i] f indeed commerciali ty carried presumptive force against a findin g of fairness, th e presumptio n would swallow nearly all the illustrative uses listed in th e preamble p aragraph of § 107 .. .. "122 The second facto r to be conside red is the nature of copyrighted work. Courts typically use this facto r to gro und a distin ction betwee n works of fact and wo rks of fictio n .l 23 But aside fro m th a t, this fac tor h as receive d scan t attention.1 24 Under m y interpreta ti o n the n ature of the work is importan t because it d e termin es the co nventions and custo m s to whi ch courts sh o uld look. Customs ~mel com ·e nti o ns Ya r y alo ng differe nt inte lle ctual good s. Co nventio n s an d practi ces th at apply to musical wor ks may be out of ph as e with rega rd to liter;._n~· or ~· i sua l works. T h e secon d fac tor directs courts to th e germane co rwe ntions of the releYant co mmunity of risk.
T he third fa c tor focus es on th e amo un t a nd substantiality of the po rtion ta ken relatiYe to th e work in its e ntire ty. In de te rmining wh e th e r too much h as been take n , co urts should resort to the no rm s and cu stoms of th e re levant communi ty. If the subse qu ent u se r h as not exceeded th e permissible, fair use sh o uld be gra nted. Only against th e backd rop of th e pertinent com munity norms would courts b e able to d ec ide wheth e r th e taking was excesstve.
Finally, th e fourth fa cto r concern s th e effect of th e un au thori ze d use on th e p ote ntial ma rke t fo r th e o rigin al work. Under n1y in te rpre tation , thi s fac tor sh o uld se rve as a safegua rd against excessive taking. An un auth orized u se th a t impairs th e m a rketability of the o ri gin al work is a lso likely to be in violation of th e relevant customary practices. This is because th e norms and con ventions that gover n activities are typically designed to en han ce th e welfare of th e individual communitv members. In this case th e Sup rem e Court was asked to d ec ide wheth e r th e m anufacture and sale of videotape recorders by Sony co n stitute d a con tributory infringement1 2:' i of the r esponde n"ts' copyrights in th e ir tel evision programs . Justice Stevens, writing for th e mcy orit:y, h eld that Sony was n ot liabl e fo r co ntributory infringeme nt on two differe nt grounds. H e began by stating that th e sale of copying equipment would n o t constitute a contributory infr ingement if the equipme nt could also b e used for legitimate, noninfringing purposes. In this regard Justice Stevens found that video tape recorders were capable of noninfringing uses, n amely noncommercial time-shifting by private use rs. H e added th at it was possible that oth er television program producers stood to gain fr om the practice of tim e-shifting, and thus e nj o ining Sony from marke ting its eq uipme nt would harm them. Justice Steve ns could h ave stopped here, but instead h e went on to analyze whether private recording of copyrighted television programs was excused under th e fair use d octrin e. Central to his fair use analysis was th e assumption that h o m e u se rs record progra m s solely for purposes of timesh ifting and not in order to establish private videotape libraries. This assumption led Justice Steve n s to pronounce, afte r discussing th e first fair use factor, that any priva te n o nc om m ercial u se is presumptively fair.
125. T he r cspo nclc n ts chose tn sun a copHi gh t infringcm e n t suit again st Son y, which mere]\' tn~mufactured th e equ ipme n t th a t co uld ha\'e been used in vio latio n of t.heir r ig hts, hut n o t ag~t inst So m·'s customers, \l·ho per form e el th e ~tctu<l i u> p\·in g. Be uusc Som itsel f dicl n o t rc prod uce th e protectccl works , th e rcspond e n ts co ul cl on I\' sue Son\' for a co n tri b u ton· in fri ngcme n r.
i-\fte r paying sh o rt tribu te to th e second and third facto rs, Stevens turn ed to th e fo urth factor-the effec t of the unauth o ri ze d use o n the market fo r th e copyri ghted work. Rne nin g to th e fact that private reco rding for purposes of ti me-shifting was a n o n corn m e rcial use of th e wo rk , h e reasoned th a t, typ ically, n o n co mmerci al u ses wo ul d not adve rse ly impact th e marke t fo r th e orig inal wo rk and rhus, in o rde r to prevail, th e co pyri gh t owner has to prove "eith e r th a t th e particul a r u se is h a rmful o r th at if it sh o uld b eco m e " ·id espread it would adve rse ly a ffec t th e pote nti al m a rke t fo r th e copyri g h te d wo rk. " 1~6 H e then co ncluded th a t in the case a t h a n d th e copyrig ht own e rs fa iled to carr y thi s burde n with resp ect to time-shiftin g.
Justice Blackmun , writin g fo r th e dissent, stresse d th e fact that und er th e Copyr ight Act the practice of un a uthorized h o m e videotaping con stitutes an in frin ge ment. In rej ectin g th e fair use d efe nse h e reasoned that reco rding fo r p rivate purposes is an u n productive use th at ge nerates no b enefi ts to th e public, and th a t it invo lves the reprodu cti on of copyrighted wo rks in the ir e ntire ty. 1~7 H e th e n cauti o n ed that gran ting fa ir use in this case mig ht e ro d e "th e very basis o f co pyrig ht law by d e privin g auth o rs of contro l ove r the ir wo rks and con se qu e ntly of their ince ntive to c r ea t e . " I~H Unde r the test proposed h e re, the majority' s fa ir use finding in So ny was clearly e rroneous. In this case , th e first prong of th e test that requires th e unauthorize d users to b e creato rs themselves was n o t satisfied. Video tape r eco rding constitutes a typi cal example of m ech anical reproduc ti o n of copyrighted materials th a t involves neither intell ectu al labor nor creative judgme nt. Thus, home use rs co uld not qualify as p ossibl e candidates for fa ir u se . By imposing on th e pro duce rs the risk of un authorized ta king of copyrighted materials, the use rs created a risk of h arm to which th ey we re n o t subj e ct themselves. As th e risk at bar was n o nreciprocal, th e co urt should have held th e un auth orized use unfair a nd h ence infringing.
Alth ou gh Congress h as n o t taken any m easures to change the outco m e of Sony, it obliquely evin ced its dissatisfaction with th e outcome of th e case by e n ac ting the Audio H o m e Recording Act of 199 2. Th e legislation o f thi s ac t was triggered by th e e m e rgence of an ad va n ced recording m edium-digital audio ta pes-tha t allows consume rs to p e rform multiple recor-dings of musical ·works with out degenera ting th e o riginal quality of th e so und.129 The act strikes a n inter esting balan ce be tween the interests of co pyright owners and th ose of use rs. On the one h and it prohibits infrin gem ent suits for home audio taping. 1 3° On th e o th e r it levies royalty ch arges 126. Sony, 464 U .S. a t 45 1.
127. !d. a t 478-82 (Bl ac kmun , J disse ntin g).
128. !d. a t 489 . 129 . Go lclstc in , Co p n ig h t's Hig h"·a,·, sujna n o te c)9 , a t 1: 18. 130. It is impo rtant to note th at the ac t docs n ot sta te tha t ho m e a ucl iotapin g fo r p ri ,·ate p u rposes is n o t a co pvright infrin gement. Instead , it prm·icles th at ·· n o actio n mav be bro ug h t u nde r th is title all eging infrin g em e n t of copni g ht."" 17 C.S.C. 8 100S ( 1 9~) 4) . According to Go ldste in th e d istin cti o n bet\\"CC!l '·c \:Cill p ti o n aga in st infringement a ncl a p ro hibition against suin g fo r infri ngeme n t"-~dth o u g h fin e-h as a "'po11·erful s1mboli c cff"cct lor cupnig ht owners." lr/ . :tt I () ;).
o n sales of digital audio recorders and tapes. Once coll ec ted, the royalti es are to b e divided among co mposers, lyricists, mu sic publishers, reco rd produce rs, and performe rs.l 31 In effect, this legislatio n sanctions th e copyright owners' right to be indemnified for h arms that result from private unauthorized copying . Thus, Sony should b e co nside red an anomaly rather th an th e rule.
C. H arper & Row Publishers In c. v. Na tion Enterprises
In this case, The Nation magazine got hold of a purloined manuscript of Preside nt Ford's then unpublished autobiograp hy that was schedul ed shortly to appear in Time magazine. Extensively quoting from this manuscript, The Nation publish ed a short piece on Ford's m emoirs that "scooped" th e forthcoming publication in Time. This publication le d Time to cancel its contract with the petition ers-Harper & Row-who owned the copyright in Ford's autobiography. Harper & Row then broug ht an action for copyright infringement against The Nation. The question before the Supreme Court was wh ether extensive quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript come under the ambit of fair use.
Critical to the majority d enial of fair use vvas th e fact that the manuscript was unpublished. In evaluating the statutory facto rs, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, reiterated numerous times that the unpublish ed nature of the work tends to negate fair use. Also significant was the fact that The Nation's publication evidently caused an economic setback to Harper & Row. Justice O'Connor did not, however, confine the fair use inquiry to the four statutory factors. Custom and fairness played a key role in her finding that The Nation's use was unfair. Her opinion conveys a clear message that conformity with customary practices and notions of fair dealing are to weigh h eavily in favor of a fair use finding. She even suggested that th e fair use inquiry could be reduced to the question "would the reasonable copyright owner have consented to the [particular unauthorized] use?" l32 Along the same line, Justice Brennan in his dissent suggested that The Nation's conduct was in line with th e prevailing customs of the press industry.133
The Supreme Court's recourse to customary norms and prevailing conventions should be commendedYH Having found that The Nation's use was arguably productive and not merely a mech anical reproduction of the copyrighted materials, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the use 131. For a more detailecl description SPf' 17 u.s.c. s § 1003-1007 ( 1994 spo ncl e n ce is essentially an a uth o r. El ec tro ni c m a il is simply a m edium throug h which users exchange messages th at may qualify for copyri g h t protec tion. Thus, insofar as E-mail messages are co n ce rn e d th e re is n o distinction benveen authors an d nonauthors. Eve r y u se r is also an a uth or. ,:-\ccord in g ly, the risk of copyin g is reciproc al by nature in the community of E-m ail users. :r..~lor eover, th e practice of reprodu cin g th e or igin al m essage in the re pl· y is commonplace in E-m ail correspondence. Con seque ntl y, with regard to e lec troni c m a il correspo ndence , copyin g of whole m essages is a re ciprocal risk , and h a rm s that mav stem frOill it sh ould not give rise to copyright liabilitv.
V. CONCLUSION
Mv a im in this articl e h as b een to demonstrate that th e fair use doc trin e I should be understood and inte rpre ted within the framework of correc tive justice. In doing so, I h ave sh own that all attempts to explicate th e d octri n e on other grounds have failed. The thrust of this articl e is that the paradigm of reciprocity of risk should guide courts and users of intellectual works in deciding what uses are fair. Specifically, I have proffered a tlvo-prong test for d ete rmining what uses are fair. The first prong provides that in th e sph ere of un authorized uses only the ones that are productive or transform a tive can possibly qualify as fair. The second holds that, of the group of pro ductive uses, only the subset that does not violate th e cu stomary practices and con ve ntions of the rel evan t community of creators be awarded fair u se .
Un d e rstood properly, the fair use doctrine is a relatively cohe re nt doctrine that aims to do justice between authors and unauthorized users of th ei r works. Striking the balance benveen authors and subsequent users according to the proposed test will lead to an outcome that is both fair and efficie nt. Furthermore, by creating conformity between the law and the expecta tions of the party, the proposed test will e n able authors and users to plan and pursue their creative e ndeavors , the re by e nriching the culture an d knowledge of us all.
